Independence-friendly logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that has the same expressive power as existential second-order logic. In her Ph.D. thesis, Dechesne introduces a variant of independence-friendly logic called IFG logic. We attempt to algebraize IFG logic in the same way that Boolean algebra is the algebra of propositional logic and cylindric algebra is the algebra of first-order logic.
IFG Logic
Imagine a sentence of first-order logic. Most likely, it has an initial block of quantifiers. If there are multiple quantifiers in the block, then some of the quantifiers are dependent on other quantifiers. In fact, there is only one possible dependence relation among the quantifiers: later quantifiers depend on prior quantifiers. Hence the dependence relation is a linear order. The first attempt to allow dependence relations other than the usual one on the quantifiers of a first-order sentence was made by Henkin [9] . He allowed the dependence relation to be a partial order, rather than a linear order. For example, in the Henkin sentence ∀x ∃y ∀z ∃w φ(x, y, z, w) the variable y depends only on x, while w depends only on z. It is a result due to Ehrenfeucht [9] that the above quantifier is not definable in ordinary first-order logic. Later it was shown independently by Enderton [7] and Walkoe [24] that first-order logic with these "branching quantifiers" has the same expressive power as existential second-order logic. Independence-friendly logic (IF logic) was introduced by Hintikka and Sandu [13] as a way to allow arbitrary dependence relations between the quantifiers of a first-order sentence. Independence-friendly logic is a conservative extension of ordinary first-order logic in that every ordinary first-order sentence has an independence-friendly counterpart that is true in exactly the same models. However, the ability to specify arbitrary dependence relations between the quantifiers (and even the connectives) means that there are far more sentences than before. It turns out that a given independence-friendly sentence has the same expressive power as a pair of contrary existential second-order sentences. In The Principles of Mathematics Revisited [12] , Hintikka argues that IF logic is the correct first-order logic and advocates for its adoption as the foundation of mathematics.
In IF logic the truth of a sentence (or formula) is defined in terms of games. Let φ be a sentence, and let A be a suitable structure. Informally, the semantic game G(A, φ) is played between two players, player 0 (Abélard) and player 1 (Eloïse). Eloïse's goal is to verify the sentence φ in the structure A, while Abélard's goal is to falsify it. A familiar example from calculus is the definition of continuity:
∀x∀ε(ε > 0 → ∃δ(δ > 0 ∧ ∀y(|x − y| < δ → |f (x) − f (y)| < ε))). Notice that Eloïse winning a single play of the game is not sufficient to guarantee that f is continuous. Likewise, Abélard winning a single play is not sufficient to show that f is not continuous. What is required for f to be continuous is for Eloïse to have a way to win every play of the game, given correct play by both players-that is, Eloïse must have a winning strategy. Dually, f is not continuous if and only if Abélard has a winning strategy. By extension, a firstorder sentence is true in a model A if and only if Eloïse has a winning strategy for the game G(A, φ), and φ is false in A if and only if Abélard has a winning strategy for G(A, φ).
In IF logic a sentence is defined to be true in a model if Eloïse has a winning strategy for the corresponding semantic game. Dually, a sentence is false in a model if Abélard has a winning strategy. For any ordinary first-order sentence φ the semantic game G(A, φ) is a two-player, win-loss game of perfect information. Hence Zermelo's theorem tells us that one of the two players must have a winning strategy. Thus every ordinary first-order sentence is either true of false. That is, one can prove the principle of bivalence for ordinary first-order sentences from the game-theoretical definition of truth.
The extension beyond ordinary first-order logic comes from the fact that in IF logic one can write down a sentence whose corresponding semantic game is not a game of perfect information by restricting the information available to the existential player. For such a sentence it is no longer the case that one of the two players must have a winning strategy. Thus it is possible for a sentence in IF logic to be neither true nor false. For example, consider the sentence ∀x∃y /x (x = y).
First Abélard chooses an element of the universe and assigns it as the value of the variable x. Then Eloïse chooses an element of the universe and assigns it to y, but Eloïse must make her choice without knowing the value of x. If Eloïse correctly guesses which element Abélard chose, she wins. Otherwise Abélard wins. It should be clear that in any structure with at least two elements, Eloïse does not have a winning strategy. Therefore the sentence is not true. But neither does Abélard have a winning strategy because there is always the possibility that Eloïse will guess correctly. Therefore the sentence is not false. It is worth noting that whether or not a sentence is undetermined depends on the structure in which the semantic game is played. For example, the sentence ∀x∃y /x (y ≤ x)
is neither true nor false in R, but it is true in N because Eloïse can always choose 0. In her Ph.D. thesis [6] Dechesne provides a rigorous mathematical foundation for an extension of IF logic in which one allows the information available to Eloïse and Abélard to be restricted. She calls her extension IFG logic (for "generalized independence-friendly logic"). Her thesis is the basis for our work. With the possible exception of Proposition 1.5, none of the results in the present section are original.
Instead of focusing on which quantifiers are independent of one another, it might seem more natural to focus on which quantifiers depend on which other quantifiers. Väänänen does exactly that in his recent book Dependence Logic [23] .
Cylindric algebra is the algebra of ordinary first-order logic in the same way that Boolean algebra is the algebra of ordinary propositional logic. Cylindric algebra was first studied by Henkin, Monk, and Tarski [10, 11] . The goal of this paper is to algebraize IFG logic in the same spirit as cylindric algebra. Our algebraization will depend heavily on the compositional semantics for independence-friendly logic put forth by Hodges [14, 15] .
Syntax
In regular first-order logic, a formula φ is a string of symbols that satisfies certain conditions, and a variable x is said to occur in φ if the symbol "x" appears in the string. In our version of IFG logic, each formula will be a pair φ, X where φ is a formula in the standard sense (a string of symbols satisfying certain conditions) and X is a finite set of variables. A variable is said to occur in φ, X if and only if it belongs to X. We require that any variable that appears in φ must belong to X. However, we will allow variables that do not appear in φ to belong to X. Thus every variable that appears in φ must occur in φ, X , but a variable may occur in φ, X without appearing in φ.
Definition. Given a first-order signature σ, an atomic IFG-formula is a pair φ, X where φ is an atomic first-order formula and X is a finite set of variables that includes every variable that appears in φ.
Definition. Given a first-order signature σ, the language L σ IFG is the smallest set of formulas such that:
1. Every atomic IFG-formula is in L From now on we will make certain assumptions about IFG-formulas that will allow us to simplify our notation. First, we will assume that the set of variables of L σ IFG is { v n | n ∈ ω }. Second, since it does not matter much which particular variables appear in a formula, we will assume that variables with smaller indices are used before variables with larger indices. More precisely, if φ, X is a formula, v j ∈ X, and i ≤ j, then v i ∈ X. By abuse of notation, if φ, X is a formula and |X| = N , then we will say that φ has N variables and write φ for φ, X . As a shorthand, we will call
Third, sometimes we will write φ ∨ /J ψ instead of φ ∨ /Y ψ and ∃v n/J φ instead of ∃v n/Y φ, where
Finally, we will use φ ∧ /J ψ to abbreviate ∼ (∼ φ ∨ /J ∼ ψ) and ∀v n/J φ to abbreviate ∼ ∃v n/J ∼ φ.
Definition. Let φ be an IFG-formula. The subformula tree of φ, denoted Sub(φ), is the smallest tree satisfying the following conditions.
Game semantics
Dechesne defines her semantic games in extensive form [6] , which is standard practice in game theory. It turns out that games in extensive form are more general than is necessary for our purposes. We modify her definition in order to focus on those aspects of the games that are relevant to the present discussion.
Definition. Given a first-order signature σ and a formula φ, X ∈ L σ IFG , a structure A is called suitable for φ if A has an interpretation for every non-logical symbol in σ.
Definition. If φ, X is a formula and A is a suitable structure, then a valuation for φ, X over A is a function from X to A. Since we are assuming that X has the form {v 0 , . . . , v N −1 }, we will identify valuations with sequences of individuals in A, denoted a ∈ 
Note that ≈ J is an equivalence relation on N A. Also note that ≈ ∅ is the identity relation and ≈ N is the total relation on N A.
Definition. If a ∈ N A, b ∈ A, and n < N , define a(n : b) to be the valuation that is like a except that v n is assigned the value b instead of a n . In other words,
We call a(n : b) an n-variant of a.
Definition. Let φ be a formula with N variables, let A be a suitable structure, and let V ⊆ N A be a team. The semantic game G(A, φ, V ) is defined as follows. A position of the game is a triple ψ, b, ε , where ψ is a subformula of φ, b ∈ 5. The final position p q is a terminal position, and p q is the only terminal position in the play.
A partial play p 0 , . . . , p ℓ is an initial segment of a play. A partial play that is not a play is called a proper partial play. For a given play of the game with final position p q = ψ, b, ε where ψ is an atomic formula, player ε wins if A |= ψ [ b] , and player 1 − ε wins if A |= ψ [ b] . In a given position ψ, b, ε , player ε is called the verifier and player 1 − ε is called the falsifier . The game G(A, φ, V ) is the set of all possible plays. We will use G(A, φ) to abbreviate G(A, φ, N A).
Definition.
A strategy for player ε for the game G(A, φ, V ) is a function S from the set of all non-terminal positions of the game in which player ε is the verifier to the set of all positions. A strategy is legal if for every proper partial play p 0 , . . . , p ℓ where player ε is the verifier in p ℓ , the sequence p 0 , . . . , p ℓ , p ℓ+1 is a partial play, where p ℓ+1 = S(p ℓ ), and
Given a play p = p 0 , . . . , p q and a strategy S for player ε, player ε is said to follow S in p if for every non-terminal position p k in which player ε is the verifier, p k+l = S(p k ). A strategy for player ε is winning if it is legal and player ε wins every play in which he or she follows S.
Observe that if V is empty the game G(A, φ, V ) has no positions nor plays. Hence the empty strategy ∅ : ∅ → ∅ is a winning strategy for both players. As we will see later when we define a Tarski-style satisfaction relation for IFG-formulas, this apparent defect is actually a feature.
Definition. We say that φ is true in A relative to V if player 1 has a winning strategy for the semantic game G(A, φ, V ), and that φ is false in A relative to V if player 0 has a winning strategy for G(A, φ, V ). In the first case, we call V a winning team (or trump) for φ in A. In the second case, we call V a losing team (or cotrump) for φ in A. We say that φ is true in A if it is true in A relative to N A, and that φ is false in A if it is false relative to
Thus φ is true in A if and only if player 1 has a winning strategy for the game G(A, φ), and φ is false in A if and only if player 0 has a winning strategy for G(A, φ). It is important to realize that restricting the information available to the players at different moves does not change the set of possible plays of the game G(A, φ, V ). It only restricts the strategies the players are allowed to use.
Definition. Let p k = ψ, b, ε be a position of the game G(A, φ, V ). The dual position of p k is p k = ψ, b, 1 − ε . If S 1 is a strategy for player 1 for G(A, φ, V ), the dual strategy S 1 for player 0 for
. If S 0 is a strategy for player 0 for G(A, φ, V ), the dual strategy S 0 for player 1 for Proof. Suppose S 1 is a winning strategy for player 1 for G(A, φ, V ). Then S 1 is a legal strategy for player 0 for G(A, ∼ φ, V ). To show that S 1 is a winning strategy, let p = p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p q be a play of G(A, ∼ φ, V ) in which player 0 follows S 1 , and let p q = ψ, b, 1 − ε . Then the corresponding play p = p 1 , . . . , p q of G(A, φ, V ) is a play in which player 1 follows S 1 and p q = ψ, b, ε . By hypothesis, player 1 wins p.
In either case, player 0 wins p.
Conversely, suppose S 1 is a winning strategy for player 0 for G(A, ∼ φ, V ). Then S 1 is a legal strategy for player 1 for G(A, ψ, V ). To show S 1 is a winning strategy, let p = p 1 , . . . , p q be a play of G(A, ψ, V ) in which player 1 follows S 1 , where p 1 = φ, a, 1 and p q = ψ, b, ε . Then p = p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p q is a play of G(A, φ, V ), where p 0 = ∼ φ, a, 1 and p q = ψ, b, 1 − ε . By hypothesis, player 0 wins p.
In either case, player 1 wins.
Similarly, S 0 is a winning strategy for player 0 for G(A, φ, V ) if and only if S 0 is a winning strategy for player 1 for G(A, ∼ φ, V ). Proof. By the previous lemma, Eloïse has a winning strategy for G(A, φ, V ) if and only if Abélard has a winning strategy for G(A, ∼ φ, V ), and Eloïse has a winning strategy for G(A, ∼ φ, V ) if and only if Abélard has a winning strategy for G(A, φ, V ). Proof. Suppose S is a winning strategy for Eloïse for G(A, φ, V ). We will construct a winning strategy for Eloïse for G(A, φ, N A). To do so, we will need to keep track of which variables the players have had the opportunity to modify during the play of the game. For each subformula ψ of φ, define a set of indices J ψ of those variables of ψ that have been unbound:
2. If ψ is a subformula of φ of the form ∼ χ, then J χ = J ψ .
3. If ψ is a subformula of φ of the form χ 1 ∨ /K χ 2 , then J χ1 = J ψ and J χ2 = J ψ .
4. If ψ is a subformula of φ of the form ∃v n/K χ, then J χ = J ψ ∪ {n}.
and F (p) = ψ, f (p), ε . Observe that F (p) is a position of G(A, φ, V ). Define a strategy T for Eloïse for G(A, φ, N A) as follows:
To show that T is a legal strategy, it suffices to observe that if p = ψ, b, ε and p
Hence S(F (p)) = S(F (p ′ )) because S is a legal strategy. Thus T (p) = T (p ′ ). To show that T is a winning strategy, let p 0 , . . . , p q be a play of G(A, φ, For example, let φ be ∃v 1 (v 0 = v 1 ), and let A be the equality structure with universe {0, 1}. Then φ, 00, 0 and v 0 = v 1 , 10, 1 are both unreachable positions of the game G(A, φ, {00, 01}). The position φ, 00, 0 is unreachable because player 1 is always the initial verifier; the position v 0 = v 1 , 11, 1 is unreachable because in any play of the game the initial valuation is either 00 or 01, and the players never have the opportunity to modify v 0 . 
Trump semantics
The main definition and theorem of this section are due to Hodges [14, 15] . See also related work by Cameron and Hodges [4] , Caicedo and Krynicki [3] , Väänänen [22] , and Dechesne [6] .
Definition. Given any set V , a cover of V is a collection of sets U such that V = U . A disjoint cover of V is a cover of V whose members are pairwise disjoint. A partition of V is a disjoint cover of V whose members are all nonempty. Sometimes the members of a partition are called cells.
Proof. Suppose a, b ∈ V , a ≈ J b, and a ∈ U ∈ U 1 ∪ U 2 . Without loss of generality, we may assume U ∈ U 1 , which implies that a ∈ V 1 , in which case
Note that any function f : V → A is independent of ∅, and that f : V → A is independent N if and only if f is a constant function.
are both subsets of V (n :
To show V 1 (n : f ) and V 2 (n : f ) are disjoint, suppose a(n : f ( a)) ∈ V 1 (n : f ) and b(n :
Finally suppose a(n :
To show that g is well defined and independent of K, suppose a, b ∈ V and a(n :
Observe that G is independent of K because m ∈ K and g is independent of K. Also observe that F is well defined and independent of J because n ∈ J and f is independent of J.
To show V (m : f )(n :
In the first case a(n : c) ∈ V 1 (n : A), and in the second case a(n : c) ∈ V 2 (n : A). Hence V (n :
We now define an Tarski-style satisfaction relation for IFG-formulas.
Definition. Let φ be an IFG N -formula, let A be a suitable structure, and let V ⊆ N A.
• If φ is atomic, then
• If φ is ∼ ψ, then
• If J ⊆ N and φ is ψ 1 ∨ /J ψ 2 , then
• If J ⊆ N and φ is ∃v n/J ψ, then
It is easy to check that the abbreviations ∧ /J and ∀v n/J behave as expected.
•
• If J ⊆ N and φ is ∀v n/J ψ, then
Definition. Let φ be an IFG N -formula, and let A be a suitable structure. Define A |= ± φ if and only if A |= ± φ[
Lemma 1.20. Let φ be an IFG N -formula, and let A be a suitable structure.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of φ. If φ is atomic the lemma holds vacuously.
, which holds by inductive hypothesis.
Suppose J ⊆ N and φ is ψ 1 ∨ /J ψ 2 . By inductive hypothesis,
. Let f be the empty function from ∅ to A. Then f is vacuously independent of J and ∅(n : f ) = ∅. Therefore
The previous result may seems anomalous, but it is necessary for technical reasons. Specifically, in the positive disjunction clause we wish to allow V 1 = V and V 2 = ∅ or vice versa, which corresponds to the situation in the game G(A, φ, V ) when the verifier always wishes to choose the same disjunct. Later we will see that the empty team is the only team that can be winning and losing for the same formula.
The next lemma records the fact that if a player has a winning strategy, given that he or she knows the current valuation belongs to V , then that strategy should win given that he or she knows the current valuation belongs to a subset of V . Lemma 1.21. Let φ be an IFG N -formula, let A be a suitable structure, and let
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of φ. The atomic case follows immediately from the definition.
which holds if and only if
is a J-saturated disjoint cover, and by inductive hypothesis A |=
The restriction of f to V ′ is independent of J, and by inductive hypothesis A |=
Next we show that a given team cannot be winning and losing for the same formula, which reflects the fact that Abélard and Eloïse cannot both have winning strategies for the same semantic game. 
Proof. We proceed by induction on the complexity of φ.
The main result of this section is that trump semantics and game semantics are equivalent. This is significant because of Hintikka's claim in The Principles of Mathematics Revisited that independence-friendly logic does not have a compositional semantics. Proof. By two simultaneous inductions on the complexity of φ. A full proof can be found in [18] .
Corollary 1.24. (a) A |= + φ if and only if φ is true in A.
(b) A |= − φ if and only if φ is false in A.
The next two results show that IFG-formulas that differ only in their number of variables have essentially the same meaning, as long as we do not encode any information in the extra variables. The phenomenon of one player using extra variables to send (otherwise forbidden) information to him or herself is called signaling. For example, let φ be the formula
and let A be the equality structure over {0, 1}. If V = {00, 01, 10, 11}, then Eloïse does not have a winning strategy for G(A, φ, V ). However, if φ ′ is the 3-variable version of φ, and 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of φ. A full proof can be found in [18] . Henceforth, we will use the same symbol for formulas that differ only in the number of variables they have. For example, we will write
2 Independence-Friendly Cylindric Set Algebras
Definition. An independence-friendly cylindric power set algebra is an algebra whose universe is P(P(
, where A is a set and N is a natural number. The set A is called the base set , and the number N is called the dimension of the algebra. Since each element X is an ordered pair, we will use the notation X + to refer to the first coordinate of the pair, and X − to refer to the second coordinate. There are a finite number of operations:
• the constant 0 = {∅}, P(
• the constant 1 = P(
• for all i, j < N , the constant D ij is defined by
• for every J ⊆ N , the binary operation + J is defined by
• for every J ⊆ N , the binary operation · J is defined by
• for every n < N and J ⊆ N , the unary operation C n,J is defined by
Definition. An independence-friendly cylindric set algebra (or IFG-algebra, for short) is any subalgebra of an independence-friendly cylindric power set algebra. An IFG N -cylindric set algebra (or IFG N -algebra) is an independence-friendly cylindric set algebra of dimension N .
We will use the notation X = + Y to abbreviate
Duality
We include the operations · J in the signature of independence-friendly cylindric set algebras for the sake of compatibility with De Morgan algebra. We could have omitted · J from the definition and instead defined it in terms of + J and ∪ .
Proof. It follows immediately from the definition that (X
The cylindrifications C n,J also have their corresponding dual operations, defined by
We do not include the dual cylindrifications in the signature of IFG N -cylindric set algebras for the sake of compatibility with cylindric algebra. Every IFG N -cylindric set algebra
has a dual algebra
∪ is an isomorphism from C to C ∂ . Therefore any algebraic statement about independence-friendly cylindric set algebras can be dualized by systematically exchanging the symbols 0 with 1, D ij with D ∪ ij , + J with · J , and C n,J with C ∂ n,J . Statements involving the superscripts + and − can be dualized by their exchange, even though the symbols + and − do not belong to the signature. In particular, the dual of ≤ is ≥. Henceforth we will often state a theorem and its dual together, but we will not prove the dual.
Fixed points
An element X of an IFG-algebra is a fixed point if X ∪ = X. Clearly X is a fixed point if and only if X + = X − . Two fixed points in particular deserve special mention. In a given IFG N -algebra, let Ω = {∅}, {∅} and ℧ = P(
. Neither the symbol Ω nor the symbol ℧ belong to the signature of IFG-algebras. However, we will see that Ω is definable in most IFG-algebras, and it is often present even when it is not definable. Lemma 2.2. In any IFG N -algebra C, if there exists an element X ∈ C such that X + ∩X − = {∅} and
Proof. Suppose X is such an element, and consider C 0,∅ . .
In any IFG-algebra of dimension at least two and whose base set has at least two elements we have D
In the next section we will show that if |A| = 1 or N = 1 then there are examples of IFG-algebras that do not include Ω.
Cs IF G N (A)
The motivating examples of IFG-algebras are those whose elements are the meanings of IFGformulas.
Definition. Given a structure A and an IFG N -formula φ, define
By Theorem 1.23, φ +
A is the set of all winning teams for φ in A, and φ − A is the set of all losing teams. We will call φ A the meaning of φ in A. If the structure is clear from context we will omit the subscript and simply write φ + , φ − , and φ .
Definition. Given an σ-structure A, the IFG N -algebra over A, denoted Cs IF GN (A), is the IFG N -algebra whose universe is the set 
In ordinary first-order logic a sentence can have one of only two possible truth-values: true or false. Thus if φ is a sentence either φ A = 0 or φ A = 1. In IFG logic a sentence φ may be neither true nor false, so φ A can take values other than 0 or 1. Interestingly, the only other possible value is Ω. Proposition 2.5. If φ is an IFG N -sentence and A is a suitable structure, then φ A ∈ {0, Ω, 1}.
A . By Proposition 1.5, in the first case φ A = 1, and in the second case φ A = 0.
Proof. If |A| = 1, then
A be the function that sends a to a 0 .
Thus if |A| = 1, Cs IFG N (A) is essentially the same structure as the two-element Boolean algebra. . We wish to show that for every IFG N -formula, either A |=
, and in the second case A |=
A be any function independent of J (e.g., a constant function). Then Definition. A set of teams X * is rooted if ∅ ∈ X * . A pair X + , X − of sets of teams is rooted if both of its coordinates are rooted. An IFG-algebra is rooted if all of its elements are rooted.
Proposition 2.9. The subalgebra of an IFG-algebra generated by a set of rooted elements is a rooted IFG-algebra.
Proof. The constant elements 0, 1, and D ij are all rooted, and if X is rooted, then X ∪ is. Suppose X and Y are rooted. Then ∅ ∈ (X + J Y )
+ because the empty function f from ∅ to A is vacuously independent of J and ∅(n :
Given a set A, let Root N (A) denote the IFG N -cylindric set algebra whose universe is the set of all rooted elements in P(P(
Definition. A nonempty subset of P( N A) is called a suit if it is closed under subsets. That is, a suit X * is a nonempty collection of subsets of
Definition. An independence-friendly cylindric set algebra is suited if all of its elements are pairs of suits. It is double-suited if all of its elements are double suits.
Note that suits, double suits, and suited independence-friendly cylindric set algebras are all rooted.
Proposition 2.10. The subalgebra of an IFG N -algebra generated by a set of pairs of suits is a suited IFG N -algebra.
Proof. The constant elements 0, 1, and D ij are all pairs of suits, and if X is a pair of suits, then so is X ∪ . Suppose X and Y are pairs of suits. If
Proposition 2.11. The subalgebra of an IFG N -algebra generated by a set of double suits is a double-suited IFG N -algebra.
Proof. The constant elements 0, 1, and D ij are all double suits, and if X is a double suit, then so is X ∪ . Suppose X and Y are double suits. We already know by the previous proposition that X + J Y is a pair of suits. To show that (X + J Y )
Suppose X is a double suit. We already know by the previous proposition that C n,J (X) is a pair of suits. To show that C n,J (X)
Given a set A, let Suit N (A) denote the IFG N -algebra whose universe is the set of all pairs of suits in P(P( N A)) × P(P( N A)). Let DSuit N (A) denote the IFG N -algebra whose universe is the set of all double suits in P(P(
IFG N -algebras and De Morgan algebra
We will refer to each pair of axioms except the last as associativity, commutativity, absorption, and distributivity, respectively. We can define a partial order ≤ on L by x ≤ y if and only if x ∨ y = y (if and only if x ∧ y = x). Hence the last pair of axioms asserts that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. We refer the reader to [1] for the elementary theory of De Morgan algebras. Unlike cylindric set algebras, independence-friendly cylindric set algebras do not have an underlying Boolean algebra structure. The complementation axioms fail. However, the reduct of a rooted IFG N -algebra to the signature 0, 1,
Proof. (a)
is a De Morgan algebra, and the same reduct of a double-suited IFG N -algebra is a Kleene algebra.
Associativity and commutativity
Let C be an IFG N -algebra with base set A. Let X, Y, Z be elements in C, let i, j, k, ℓ, m, n < N , let J, K, L ⊆ N , and let V, W ⊆ N A.
Proposition 2.13.
Proposition 2.14.
, and V 3 ∈ Z + . By Lemma 1.12,
Associativity can fail if the two operations are not the same. For example, let A be the structure with universe A = {0, 1, 2} in which each element is named by a constant symbol. Of course, on the falsity-axis, ((X + ∅ Y ) + N Z)
+ . This suggests the following strengthening of Proposition 2.14.
+ , and V 3 ∈ Z + . By Lemma 1.10 and Lemma 1.12,
, and V 3 are pairwise disjoint, we have by Lemma 1.11 that
+ . (b) This is just the dual of part (a). 
Hence X is rooted. Conversely, suppose X is rooted. Then (X · J 0) + = X + ∩ 0 + = {∅}, and for every V ⊆ 
Proposition 2.17. If X and Y are double suits, and X
≤ Ω ≤ Y , then X · J Y = X and X + J Y = Y . Proof. Suppose X ≤ Ω ≤ Y . Then X + = {∅} = Y − , so (X · J Y ) + = X + ∩ Y + = {∅} = X − ∩ Y − = (X + J Y ) − . Also, V ∈ (X + J Y ) + if and only if V ∈ Y + , and W ∈ (X · J Y ) − if and only if W ∈ X − . Therefore X · J Y = X and X + J Y = Y .
Absorption
The absorption axioms do not hold in general, but they do hold in important special cases. For example, if X is not rooted then (X + N X) + = ∅ = (X · N X) − . Hence X + N (X · K 1) = X whenever X is a nonempty, non-rooted element. In contrast, if X and Y are rooted, then the absorption axioms hold partially for every pair of addition and multiplication operations, and they hold fully when the "outside" operation is + N or · N . 
Lemma 2.18. If Y is rooted, then
X + ⊆ (X + J Y ) + and X − ⊆ (X · J Y ) − . Proof. Suppose V ∈ X + . Then V = V ∪ J ∅, where V ∈ X + and ∅ ∈ Y + . Hence V ∈ (X + J Y ) + .
Lemma 2.19. If X and Y are rooted, then (X +
To show that absorption can fail even when X and Y are rooted, consider the IFG 2 -cylindric set algebra over the equality structure A whose universe is A = {0, 1}. Let X = D 01 + N D ∪ 01 . Then X + = {∅, {00}, {01}, {10}, {11}, {00, 11}, {01, 10}},
However, {00, 01, 10, 11} ∈ (X + ∅ (X + N X)) + because {00, 01, 10, 11} = {00, 11} ∪ ∅ {01, 10}, where {00, 11} ∈ X + and {01, 10} ∈ X + = (X + N X) + . Thus
One can obtain a similar example where (X · ∅ (X + N X))
, which demonstrates that the complementation axioms fail in any IFG-algebra of dimension greater than 1.
Lemma 2.22. Suppose X and Y are rooted. Then
Thus, the reduct of a rooted IFG N -algebra to the signature + N , · N is a lattice. As with all lattices, we can define a partial order ≤ 
Proof. By Proposition 2.16 and Proposition 2.23.
Therefore, when X is rooted, we have the following string of inequalities:
Distributivity
Lemma 2.27. Suppose X is a double suit. Then
To show that distributivity can fail, consider the IFG 2 -cylindric set algebra over the structure A whose universe is A = {0, 1} and in which each element is named by a constant. Let X = v 0 = 0 + N v 0 = 1 , and let V = {00, 01, 10, 11},
Lemma 2.28. Suppose X, Y , and Z are rooted.
Proof.
The previous lemmas and propositions combine to yield the following theorem. 
Complementation
We have already remarked that the complementation axioms fail in independence-friendly cylindric set algebras. The failure of the complementation axioms stems from the failure of the law of excluded middle in IFG logic. However sentences of the form φ ∧ /J ∼ φ are never true, while sentences of the form φ ∨ /K ∼ φ are never false. 
Proof. Suppose X and Y are double suits. Then (X · J X ∪ )
Thus, if a double-suited IFG N -cylindric set algebra includes Ω, then
Theorem 2.31. The reduct of a double-suited IFG N -algebra to the signature 0, 1,
Even though the complementation axioms do not hold universally, it might still be possible for particular elements to satisfy them. In a double-suited IFG N -algebra, the only elements that satisfy the complementation axioms are 0 and 1.
Lemma 2.33. Suppose X is a double suit. Then X + N X ∪ = 1 if and only if X = 0 or X = 1.
Proof. Suppose X + N X ∪ = 1. Then, by the previous lemma, (X + N X ∪ )
Definition. Let L be a bounded lattice. Two elements x, y ∈ L are complements if x ∨ y = 1 and x ∧ y = 0. An element x ∈ L is complemented if it has a complement.
For example, Ω and ℧ are complements in any IFG-algebra that includes both. 
IFG N -algebras and cylindric algebra
In addition to the axioms of Boolean algebra, the axioms of cylindric algebra [10] are:
We will show that analogs of the axioms (C1)-(C6) hold in all double-suited independencefriendly cylindric set algebras. Axiom (C7) does not hold in general, even in double-suited independence-friendly cylindric set algebras.
Axiom C1
Proposition 2.36. C n,J (0) = 0 and C ∂ n,J (1) = 1.
which holds if and only if V = ∅. Thus V ∈ 0 + . Conversely, suppose V ∈ 0 + . Then V = ∅. Observe that the empty function f from ∅ to A is vacuously independent of J and ∅(n :
Proposition 2.37. If X is a double suit, then C n,J (X) = 0 if and only if X = 0.
Proof. Observe that
We know that C n,J (℧) is a pair of suits because ℧ is. Thus it suffices to show that
Observe that for any f :
Proposition 2.39. C n,J (1) = 1 and C ∂ n,J (0) = 0.
Proof. That C n,J (1)
Therefore C n,J (1)
If n / ∈ J, the projection pr n : V → A that maps a to a n is independent of J, and
and ∅ ∈ C n,J (X) − , or vice versa. If W ∈ X − we are done, so suppose W ∈ C n,J (X)
− is also a suit. In particular, ∅ ∈ C n,J (X)
To give an example where n ∈ J and X · K C n,J (X) = + X, let A be the equality structure with universe A = {0, 1}, and consider Cs IFG 2 (A). Observe that
In section 2.5 we showed that the partial order ≤ interacts nicely with the operations ∪ , + J , and · J (see Proposition 2.25 and Proposition 2.26). It interacts equally well with the operations C n,J and C ∂ n,J . In particular, the previous proposition shows that in a double-suited
Thus, if X and Y are double suits and n ∈ K ∩ L, then
which implies that there is a g :
which implies that there is a function g :
To give an example where (b) fails, again let A be the equality structure with universe A = {0, 1}, and consider Cs IFG 2 (A). Setting X = 1 and Y = D 01 , observe that
To see why, suppose the contrary. Then there is an f :
In the first case, {00, 10}(1 : g) ∈ D + 01 for some g : {00, 10} →
{0}
A. Since g is a constant function, either {00, 10}(1 : g) = {00, 10} or {00, 10}(1 : g) = {01, 11}. Note that neither set belongs to D + 01 . The second case is similar.
Axiom
The reverse containment follows by symmetry. Therefore
Observe that f is independent of J because j / ∈ J. Also note that
To show that the hypothesis j / ∈ J is necessary, let A be the equality structure A with universe is A = {0, 1}, and consider Cs IFG2 (A). Observe that
2.6.6 Axiom C6 Proposition 2.47. If i / ∈ J or j / ∈ J, and i = k = j, then
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose i / ∈ J and
Then every a ∈ V has the property that a i = a j . Since i / ∈ J, the projection pr i : V → J A is independent of J, and every b ∈ V (k : pr i ) has the property that
Then every a ∈ W has the property that a i = a j . Let
− .
Axiom C7
Axiom C7 is a complementation axiom, so it is not surprising that it fails in IFG-algebras. Nevertheless, like the Boolean complementation axioms, axiom C7 fails in a nice way.
Proposition 2.48. If X is a double suit and i = j, then
Thus an IFG-formula of the form
is never true. However, it might not be false. Let A be the structure whose universe is A = {0, 1} and in which every element is named by a constant, and consider the 2-dimensional IFG-cylindric set algebra over A. Let X = v 0 = 0 + N v 0 = 1 . Then
To see why, suppose to the contrary that
Consider the valuations 00 and 11. Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that 00 ∈ W 1 . Then 00 ∈ W 1 (0 : 
+ , and let f n be the function that takes the constant value a n . Then for any V ⊆ In terms of IFG logic, what Proposition 2.51 says is that the semantic game associated with ∃v 0/J 0 . . . ∃v N −1 /JN−1 φ is like the game associated with φ except that Eloïse is allowed to choose the initial valuation. Since Eloïse can use constant functions to specify any initial valuation she wishes, the amount of information available to her is irrelevant. Proof. Suppose X ∈ C \ {0, 1}. Then
and there exists a nonempty team
2.7 The trivial algebra and IFG 0 -algebras 
The only rooted element is {∅}, {∅} , which is a double suit.
Suppose C is an IFG N -algebra such that |C| = 1. Then the base set A must be empty because otherwise 0 = {∅}, P(
It is important to distinguish between the empty team ∅ and the team that includes only the empty valuation {∅}. To avoid confusion let a = ∅ be the empty valuation. Then P(P( N A)) × P(P( N Theorem 3.2 (Kalman [17] 
Monadic De Morgan algebras
A monadic Boolean algebra is a Boolean algebra with an additional unary operation called a quantifier. Monadic Boolean algebras were first studied by Halmos [8] following the investigations of McKinsey and Tarski [19] into the algebraic properties of closure operators. Cignoli [5] generalized the notion of a monadic Boolean algebra by adding quantifiers to bounded distributive lattices. Cignoli calls a bounded distributive lattice with a quantifier a Q-distributive lattice. Petrovich [20, 21] extended the results of Cignoli to monadic De Morgan algebras. Our presentation follows [21] .
Definition. An existential quantifier on a bounded distributive lattice is a unary operation ∇ such that:
A universal quantifier is a unary operation ∆ such that:
The two kinds of quantifiers are dual to each other in the usual way. A quantifier without modification is assumed to be existential. A Q-distributive lattice L, ∇ is a bounded distributive lattice L equipped with a quantifier ∇.
Definition. An quantifier on a De Morgan algebra must satisfy the additional condition:
A De Morgan algebra equipped with a quantifier is called a monadic De Morgan algebra. Proof. Suppose ∇ is a quantifier on A. Then 0 = ∇0, 1 = ∇1, and ∼ ∇x = ∇(∼ ∇x). Also, ∇x ∨ ∇y = ∇(x ∨ y), and ∇x ∧ ∇y = ∇(x ∧ ∇y). Thus the range of ∇ is a subalgebra of A.
Conversely, suppose the range of ∇ is a subalgebra of A. Then ∼ ∇x is in the range of ∇, so ∇(∼ ∇x) = ∼ ∇x.
Example. Let A be a De Morgan algebra, and let ∇ be defined by
Then ∇ is a quantifier on A. Such a quantifier will be called a quantifier of type 0 . If A is any De Morgan algebra, then A, ∇ 0 will denote the monadic De Morgan algebra A with the type 0 quantifier. In particular, B, ∇ 0 , K, ∇ 0 , and M, ∇ 0 are all monadic De Morgan algebras.
Lemma 3.9. If A is a centered Kleene algebra with fixed point c, then
Proof. If A is a centered Kleene algebra with fixed point c, then A is isomorphic to a subdirect product B of copies of K. If x = 0 in A, then the corresponding tuple y ∈ B has at least one nonzero coordinate y i . Let a = a, a, . . . be the fixed point of B. Then y i ∈ {a, 1}, so
Example. Let A be a centered De Morgan algebra, and let a be a fixed point of A. Define ∇ by
Then ∇ is a quantifier on A if and only if { x ∈ A | x ∧ a = 0 } = {0}. Such a quantifier will be called a quantifier of type 1 . If A is a centered Kleene algebra with fixed point a, then a is unique and { x ∈ A | x ∧ a = 0 } = {0}. Hence ∇ is a quantifier on A. If A is a centered Kleene algebra, let A, ∇ 1 denote the monadic Kleene algebra A with the type 1 quantifier. In particular, K, ∇ 1 is a monadic Kleene algebra.
Example. Let A be a centered De Morgan algebra with two fixed points a and b such that a ∧ b = 0 and a ∨ b = 1, i.e., A contains a subalgebra isomorphic to M. Define ∇ by
It is easy to check that ∇ satisfies axioms Q1-Q3. To check Q4, suppose x, y ∈ A. If x = 0 or y = 0, then ∇(x ∧ ∇y) = 0 = ∇x ∧ ∇y. If 0 < x, y ≤ a, then ∇(x ∧ ∇y) = a = ∇x ∧ ∇y. Similarly, if 0 < x, y ≤ b, then ∇(x ∧ ∇y) = b = ∇x ∧ ∇y. If x ≤ a, b and 0 < y ≤ a, then x ∧ a = 0 by Lemma 3.10, so
Similarly, if x ≤ a, b and 0 < y ≤ b, then x ∧ b = 0, so
Thus ∇ is a quantifier on the underlying bounded distributive lattice of A, and since the range of ∇ is a subalgebra of A, Lemma 3.8 tells us that ∇ is a quantifier on A. Such a quantifier will be called a quantifier of type 2 . If A is a De Morgan algebra with two specified fixed points a and b, then A, ∇ 2 will denote the monadic De Morgan algebra A with the associated type 2 quantifier. In particular, M, ∇ 2 is a monadic De Morgan algebra.
Proposition 3.11 (Petrovich [21] Proof. Since ∇ is a quantifier of type 0, type 1, or type 2, and every fixed point in A is fixed by ∇, A can have at most two fixed points. Furthermore, if A has two distinct fixed points, then ∇ must be a quantifier of type 2. If A has a unique fixed point c, then ∇ must be a quantifier of type 1. Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that there exists an x ∈ A such that x ∧ ∼ x ≤ c. Then ∇(x ∧ ∼ x) = 1 and ∼ ∇(x ∧ ∼ x) = 0, contrary to hypothesis. Therefore, for every x, y ∈ A we have x ∧ ∼ x ≤ c ≤ y ∨ ∼ y. Hence A is a Kleene algebra.
If A is not centered, then ∇ must be a quantifier of type 0. Suppose for the sake of a contradiction that there exists an x ∈ A such that x ∧ ∼ x > 0. Then ∇(x ∧ ∼ x) = 1 and ∼ ∇(x ∧ ∼ x) = 0, contrary to hypothesis. Therefore A satisfies the equation x ∧ ∼ x = 0. Hence A is a Boolean algebra.
Let M
∇2 denote the variety of monadic De Morgan algebras that satisfy the equation equivalent to ∇(x ∧ ∼ x) ≤ ∼ ∇(x ∧ ∼ x), and let K ∇1 denote the variety of monadic Kleene algebras that satisfy ∇(x ∧ ∼ x) ≤ ∼ ∇(x ∧ ∼ x). ∇2 = B ∇ and
By Corollary 3.15,
∇ let a and b be the fixed points of M, and let A be the In particular, in the one-dimensional case C 0,{0} (X · {0} X ∪ ) ≤ C 0,{0} (X · {0} X ∪ ) ∪ . Thus the variety generated by the monadic De Morgan reducts of all double-suited IFG 1 -algebras is contained in K ∇1 .
Conjecture. The variety generated by the monadic De Morgan reducts of all double-suited IFG 1 -algebras is K ∇1 .
To prove the conjecture it would be sufficient to show that every monadic Kleene algebra in K ∇1 is a homomorphic image of a subalgebra of a product of De Morgan reducts of double-suited IFG 1 -algebras. By Corollary 3.19 it suffices to consider monadic Kleene algebras with type 1 quantifiers and monadic Boolean algebras with type 0 quantifiers.
Definition. Let L be a lattice. An element a ∈ L is join irreducible if a = x ∨ y implies a = x or a = y. Dually, b ∈ L is meet irreducible if b = x ∧ y implies b = x or b = y. Proof. Let K, ∇ be a monadic Kleene algebra with a quantifier of type 1 in which 0 is meet irreducible and 1 is join irreducible. Let c be the fixed point of K, and consider the interval L = [c, 1] as a bounded distributive lattice with minimum c and maximum 1. Let A be the set of prime filters on L, and let σ be the Priestley isomorphism x → { F ∈ A | x ∈ F }. Since 1 is join irreducible we have that {1} is a prime filter, and for all x ∈ L, {1} ∈ σ(x) if and only if x = 1.
There is a partition P of P(A) such that |P | = |A|, every cell of the partition includes a singleton, but no two singletons belong to the same cell. Let f : A → P be a bijection such that for all a ∈ A, {a} ∈ f (a), and A ∈ f ({1}). Define g : P(A) → P(P(A)) \ {∅} by Suppose u is a nonempty member of the left-hand side. Then for some a ∈ σ(x)∩σ(y), u ∈ f (a). That is, there is a prime filter a such that x, y ∈ a and u ∈ f (a), which is enough to show that u belongs to the right-hand side. Conversely, suppose v is a nonempty member of the right-hand side. Then for some a ∈ σ(x) and some b ∈ σ(y), v ∈ f (a) and v ∈ f (b). However, if a and b were distinct, f (a) and f (b) would be disjoint. Thus a = b, and v belongs to the left-hand side. The function G is injective because g and σ are. Also note that there is a singleton {a} ∈ G(x) whenever x > c, and A ∈ G(x) if and only if {1} ∈ σ(x) if and only if x = 1.
Define a function h from K, ∇ to the monadic De Morgan reduct of Root 1 (A) by h(x) = G(x ∨ c), G(∼ x ∨ c) . If x = y, then either x ∨ c = y ∨ c or ∼ x ∨ c = ∼ y ∨ c because in a distributive lattice x ∨ c = y ∨ c and x ∧ c = y ∧ c imply x = y. Thus h is injective.
To show that h is a homomorphism, observe that by Lemma 2.49. Therefore h is an embedding.
Note that Theorem 3.23 does not resolve the conjecture because the elements in the range of h are not double suits (or even pairs of suits).
